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I.   INTRODUCTION
 “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial depart-
ment to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular 
cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule.”1 This un-
wavering maxim written over 200 years ago by Justice John Mar-
shall continues to resonate in federal courtrooms today. Yet, judges 
often face difficulties when attempting to heed Marshall’s words, es-
pecially when tasked with interpreting an ambiguous statute. Fur-
thermore, disagreement over what device the court should grab out of 
its interpretive toolbox to provide clarity may impede a judge’s ability 
to effectively “say what the law is.”2 One common interpretive prac-
tice looks to traditional legislative history,3 including committee re-
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 * J.D. Florida State University, College of Law, 2011; B.S. Finance, Florida State 
University, College of Business, 2008. The author wishes to thank Professor Tara Grove 
and Brett Dennis for their helpful comments and guidance on earlier drafts, Professor Jo-
Len Wolf for her continuing guidance, and the author’s family for their constant support 
and encouragement. 
 1.  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). 
 2. Id. 
 3. See, e.g., Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892). In Holy 
Trinity Church, the court looked beyond the plain meaning of the text and consulted both 
the House and Senate Committee Reports when interpreting the Alien Contract Labor 
Laws of 1885. Id. at 464-65; see also Note, Why Learned Hand Would Never Consult 
Legislative History Today, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1005, 1010 (1992) [hereinafter Note, Learned 
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ports, sponsor statements, and floor debates. Others seek to clarify 
ambiguities with dictionary definitions.4 However, under recent ad-
ministrations, a new tool has found its way into the judiciary’s as-
sortment of interpretive aides—presidential signing statements. 
Presidents continue to issue more signing statements each year, of-
ten times asserting their own interpretation of a statute.5 Utilization 
of this executive tool presents the question: should these statements 
be characterized as a new form of legislative history on which federal 
courts should rely when engaging in statutory construction?  
 While signing a bill into enactment, the President will often issue 
what is termed a signing statement—a written, official pronounce-
ment relating to the legislation.6 Though these statements have vari-
ous applications, they have predominately served four specific func-
tions.7 The pronouncements may explain the President’s understand-
ing as to the effects of a bill’s adoption, advise members of the Execu-
tive Branch of how to interpret or administer a bill, and state wheth-
er the President thinks certain provisions of a bill, if applied, might 
violate the Constitution.8 However, this Note focuses on the use of 
signing statements that “create legislative history to which the courts 
are expected to give some weight when construing the enactment,” a 
function considered exceedingly controversial.9
 Part of the controversy stems from the absence of a definitive an-
swer on how interpreting courts should treat presidential signing 
statements. Courts have not ultimately decided whether signing 
statements should be treated as an authoritative source of legislative 
history.10 Furthermore, judicial reliance on signing statements has 
been “sporadic and unpredictable.”11 Scholarly debate also reflects a 
sense of unpredictability, as opinions concerning the statements’ ap-
propriate place in statutory construction vary drastically. Some scho-
lars argue that these statements hold no interpretive weight and 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Hand ] (stating that Holy Trinity Church “marked the beginning of an accelerating shift 
toward the use of legislative history”). 
 4. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
228 (2000). 
 5. See infra Part II. 
 6. T.J. HALSTEAD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS:
CONSTITUTIONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS 1 (2007), 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33667.pdf. 
 7. Kristy L. Carroll, Comment, Whose Statute is it Anyway?: Why and How Courts 
Should Use Presidential Signing Statements When Interpreting Federal Statutes, 46 CATH.
U. L. REV. 475, 488-90 (1997). 
 8. The Legal Significance of Presidential Signing Statements, 17 Op. Off. Legal 
Counsel 131, 131 (1993) [hereinafter Legal Significance]. Discussion of these particular 
uses of signing statements is beyond the scope of this Note. 
 9. Id.
 10. Note, Context-Sensitive Deference to Presidential Signing Statements, 120 HARV. L.
REV. 597, 600 (2006) [hereinafter Note, Context-Sensitive Deference].
 11. S. 3731, 109th Cong. § 2(6) (2006).  
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should not be defined as legislative history,12 while some claim they 
should at least be considered “species of statutory interpretation,” 
but should not be included among traditional legislative sources.13
Others contend that the statements are more comparable to “execu-
tive implementation of a statute”; therefore, they should be provided 
the same level of deference courts typically assign agency interpreta-
tions.14 To further complicate the matter, Presidents have not formal-
ly declared how much weight an interpreting court should give their 
statements.  
 Evidence of the judiciary’s conflicting opinions was recently show-
cased in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,15 a 2006 case presented to the United 
States Supreme Court. The Court was asked to determine whether 
the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, which truncated the ability of 
Guantánamo Bay detainees to bring lawsuits,16 applied retroactively 
to cases currently pending or whether it was only applicable to law-
suits filed after the legislation was enacted.17 The majority opinion, 
relying on legislative history, reached the conclusion that the Act on-
ly applied to future lawsuits and not those currently pending.18 In 
dissent, Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Thomas and Alito, con-
demned the majority’s reliance on legislative history.19 While Scalia 
noted the Court should not have deferred to legislative history be-
cause the language of the Act was “unambiguous,” he nevertheless 
criticized the Court for ignoring President Bush’s signing statement 
which “explicitly set forth his understanding that the DTA [Detainee 
Treatment Act] ousted jurisdiction over pending cases.”20 While this 
case demonstrates the Court’s awareness of the debate, the division 
among the Court regarding the proper treatment of presidential sign-
ing statements in statutory interpretation only affirms that the issue 
remains unresolved. 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 12. See, e.g., Marc N. Garber & Kurt A. Wimmer, Presidential Signing Statements as 
Interpretations of Legislative Intent: An Executive Aggrandizement of Power, 24 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 363, 363 (1987). 
 13. Note, Context-Sensitive Deference, supra note 10, at 598. 
 14. Id. at 608. The standard of deference for agency interpretations is stated in 
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). In Skidmore, the Court looked to the 
Administrator’s opinions when interpreting the Fair Labor Standards Act and determined 
the weight of such opinions “will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its 
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later 
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to 
control.” Id. at 140. 
 15. 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
 16. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005(e)(1), 119 Stat. 2739, 
2742 (2005). 
 17. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 574. 
 18. Id. at 576-84. 
 19. Id. at 665 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 20. Id. at 665-66. 
182 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:179 
 This Note attempts to provide a solution. Although signing state-
ments are not without their problems, courts should not completely 
discount them when interpreting federal statutes. This Note argues 
instead that presidential signing statements should be added to 
courts’ interpretive toolbox as a new form of legislative history. How-
ever, because of the potential pitfalls, judicial reliance should be con-
strained. Thus, this Note contends that the statements are not dispo-
sitive and should be given minimal interpretive weight as a compo-
nent in the overall context that judges consider. Deference should 
also be conditioned on two factors: (1) evidence that the President 
and Executive Branch were involved in drafting the legislation under 
judicial scrutiny and (2) that the statement should serve only as col-
lateral support to a conclusion the court reaches with other interpre-
tive tools. To provide some context to the debate, Part II of this Note 
includes a brief analysis of the historical background surrounding 
presidential signing statements. Next, Part III discusses the types of 
legislative history traditionally consulted by courts. While there is 
significant debate over the legitimacy of legislative history, the foun-
dation of this Note rests on the assumption that it can provide help-
ful insight to an interpreting court. Based on a comparative analysis 
between presidential signing statements and legislative history, this 
Note concludes that signing statements are similar to nonlegislator 
statements and subsequent legislative history and should be treated 
as such by courts for interpretive purposes. Part IV expands upon 
this comparative analysis by examining the practical and institution-
al implications that would result if signing statements were provided 
the proposed level of deference.  
II.   A HISTORICAL LOOK AT THE USE OF PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING 
STATEMENTS
A.   The Early Years 
 Early forms of presidential signing statements were predomi-
nately “ceremonial.”21 The President generally issued the pro-
nouncements to congratulate Congress for the passage of a new bill22
or to express “appreciation to those who have provided support 
through the legislative process.”23 Yet, in the nineteenth century, the 
Monroe Administration issued statements that were more than ce-
remonial; namely, they described the President’s personal insights on 
legislation.24 In regards to a bill that dictated the method for se-
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 21. Carroll, supra note 7, at 476. 
 22. Id.; see also Garber & Wimmer, supra note 12, at 363. 
 23. PHILLIP J. COOPER, BY ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT: THE USE AND ABUSE OF 
EXECUTIVE DIRECT ACTION 213 (2002). 
 24. ABA TASK FORCE ON PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS AND THE SEPARATION OF 
POWERS DOCTRINE, RECOMMENDATION 7 (2006), 
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lecting military officers, President Monroe attached a statement dec-
laring “the President, not Congress, bore the constitutional responsi-
bility for appointing military officers.”25
 Presidents Andrew Jackson and John Tyler also composed state-
ments that did more than just praise congressional efforts.?? Howev-
er, these early statements were accompanied by early forms of criti-
cism. In 1830, President Jackson issued a statement expressing his 
understanding that a road authorized by an appropriations bill was 
to be limited to the territory of Michigan.27 Shortly thereafter, the 
House issued a report stating that Jackson’s declaration amounted to 
a line-item veto.28 Similarly, President Tyler issued a statement in 
1840 disagreeing with certain provisions in a bill that apportioned 
congressional districts.29 John Quincy Adams, a spokesman for the 
House of Representatives at the time, questioned the very issuance of 
the document and “advised that the signing statement should ‘be re-
garded in no other light than a defacement of the public records and 
archives.’ ”30 Despite the criticism, Presidents continued to issue 
statements that asserted their opinions of newly enacted legisla-
tion,31 and by the 1950s, signing statements became a common presi-
dential tool.32
B.   The Reagan Administration: Establishing the Legitimacy of 
Presidential Signing Statements 
 Before Ronald Reagan took office in 1981, it is estimated that only 
ten signing statements included presidential interpretations of feder-
al statutes.33 While previous Presidents began to expand this largely 
ceremonial practice, the Reagan Administration solidified it as a po-
litical one. Fueled by media opposition towards the Executive 
Branch, as well as the “skepticism and even open hostility from” 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
http://www.abanet.org/op/signingstatements/aba_final_signing_statements_recommendatio
n-report_7-24-06.pdf [hereinafter ABA TASK FORCE REPORT] (discussing a statement issued 
by Monroe that was not congratulatory but, instead, stated his opinion on how a specific 
law was to be enforced).  
 25. Id.
 26. See Frank B. Cross, The Constitutional Legitimacy and Significance of 
Presidential “Signing Statements”, 40 ADMIN. L. REV. 209, 210 (1988). 
 27. Id.
 28. HALSTEAD, supra note 6, at 2.  
 29. ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 24, at 7. 
 30. Id. (quoting Christopher S. Kelley, A Comparative Look at the Constitutional 
Signing Statement: The Case of Bush and Clinton 5 (April 2003) (presented at the 61st 
Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association)). 
 31. See, e.g., Legal Significance, supra note 8, at 139-41 (discussing the use of signing 
statements by various Presidents including President Johnson through President Carter). 
 32. HALSTEAD, supra note 6, at 2. 
 33. See William D. Popkin, Judicial Use of Presidential Legislative History: A 
Critique, 66 IND. L.J. 699, 702 (1991). 
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Congress,34 President Reagan and his administration envisioned the 
statements as a means of asserting executive power in the face of a 
“post-Watergate Congress they viewed as having grown too powerful.”35
 With this sort of political maneuvering in mind, President Reagan 
sought to characterize presidential signing statements as legislative 
history so they would be used by courts as a legitimate, interpretive 
device. The idea was first presented to Edwin Meese, the Attorney 
General at the time, by two young attorneys, Steven Calabresi and 
John Harrison.36 Calabresi and Harrison composed a memorandum 
to Meese maintaining that statements attached to legislation which 
offer the President’s interpretation of unclear statutes could increase 
the President’s influence over the law.37 Concerned with reinstating 
political authority to the Executive Branch, Meese applauded the 
proposition and wrote to West Publishing Company requesting that 
the President’s statements be included with traditional legislative 
history in the United States Code Congressional and Administrative 
News.38 Further support for legitimizing signing statements also came 
from the future Supreme Court Justice Samuel A. Alito. Alito, a mem-
ber of the Litigation Strategy Working Group at the time, wrote a 
memorandum suggesting a plan to implement presidential statements 
as interpretive aides,39 noting that “signing statements [should] as-
sume their rightful place in the interpretation of legislation.”40
 The aggressive measures employed by the Reagan Administration 
seemed to have led to the desired result. During his time in office, 
President Reagan issued approximately 250 statements,41 some of 
which explicitly stated his understanding of a statute’s meaning. For 
example, when signing the Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1987, 
President Reagan attached a statement explaining his understanding 
that the bill did not apply retroactively.42 Furthermore, the Execu-
tive Branch started to gain influence over the law as courts began to 
give some legal effect to signing statements.43 In the 1986 case Bow-
sher v. Synar, the Court cited to a presidential signing statement ex-
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 34. See COOPER, supra note 23, at 202. 
 35. Sofia E. Biller, Flooded by the Lowest Ebb: Congressional Responses to 
Presidential Signing Statements and Executive Hostility to the Operation of Checks and 
Balances, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1067, 1069 (2008). 
 36. CHARLIE SAVAGE, TAKEOVER: THE RETURN OF THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY AND THE 
SUBVERSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 232 (2007). 
 37. Id.
 38. Id.
 39. Id. at 233. 
 40. Memorandum from Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of 
Legal Counsel 1 (Feb. 5, 1986), http://www.archives.gov/news/samuel-alito/accession-060-
89-269/Acc060-89-269-box6-SG-LSWG-AlitotoLSWG-Feb1986.pdf. 
 41. HALSTEAD, supra note 6, at 3. 
 42. Statement Accompanying Signing of Pub. L. No. 100-71, 23 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
DOC. 800 (July 11, 1987). 
 43. Id.
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pressing the President’s view concerning the act under scrutiny.44
However, courts rarely relied on the statements in an authoritative 
manner.45 And, as can be expected, the increased use of signing 
statements during this time sparked debate concerning the appropri-
ate application of signing statements.46
C.   Modern Use and Critiques of Presidential Signing Statements 
 Although the Reagan Administration ended in 1989, the expan-
sive use of presidential signing statements did not. President Rea-
gan’s successor, George H.W. Bush, issued 228 statements.47 Presi-
dent Bush, like his predecessor, attempted to protect executive power 
but did so with a more “hostile tone.”48 President Clinton also fol-
lowed suit and issued 381 signing statements.49 However, one scholar 
argues that President Clinton’s statements represented more of a di-
alogue between the Executive Branch and Congress.50 While the 
amount of statements issued after the Reagan Administration steadily 
increased without inciting much criticism, use of the statements by 
George W. Bush prompted much trepidation over the practice. 
 Challenging almost 1,200 separate provisions of legislation,51
George W. Bush has been critiqued as making the “most aggressive 
use of the device.”52 Such aggression was fueled by an ideal the Bush 
Administration referred to as the unitary executive.53 President Bush 
attempted to protect the executive power, yet on a much more ex-
treme level than the presidents that came before him. Particularly, 
Bush’s signing statements often contained boilerplate language re-
quiring the Executive Branch to construe provisions “in a manner 
consistent with the President’s constitutional authority to supervise 
the unitary [E]xecutive [B]ranch and to withhold information that 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 44. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 719 n.1 (1986). 
 45. See, e.g., HALSTEAD, supra note 6, at 4. 
 46. See generally Brad Waites, Note, Let Me Tell You What You Mean: An Analysis of 
Presidential Signing Statements, 21 GA. L. REV. 755, 774-75 (1987) (discussing the Justice 
Department’s and Reagan’s publication of signing statements as creating the possibility of 
the Executive Branch exerting undue influence over the judiciary); Garber & Wimmer, 
supra note 12, at 363 (arguing that judicial reliance on presidential signing statements 
“would violate the Constitution’s separation of powers doctrine”). 
 47. HALSTEAD, supra note 6, at 5. 
 48. Biller, supra note 35, at 1082. 
 49. HALSTEAD, supra note 6, at 6. 
 50. Biller, supra note 35, at 1084-85. 
 51. Charlie Savage, Obama’s Embrace of Bush Tactic Criticized by Lawmakers From 
Both Parties, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2009, at A16. Most of President Bush’s signing 
statements noted that certain provisions of the proposed legislation were unconstitutional 
and would not be enforced by the executive branch. Thus, a majority of his signing 
statements did not attempt to offer interpretive insight of federal statutes. SAVAGE, supra 
note 36, at 237. 
 52. SAVAGE, supra note 36, at 230. 
 53. Statement Accompanying Signing of H.R. 4548, 40 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOCS.
3012 (Dec. 23, 2004). 
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could impair foreign relations, national security, the deliberative 
processes of the Executive, or the performance of the Executive’s  
constitutional duties.”54
 The sheer volume of challenges Bush made to legislation generat-
ed numerous attacks against presidential signing statements. First, 
the American Bar Association instructed a task force to investigate 
the use of these pronouncements.55 While the report stated it was not 
a direct attack against President Bush,56 the contents and critiques 
contained therein seemed to indicate otherwise. Ultimately, the task 
force did not address whether the statements carry interpretive 
weight but did recommend opposing any signing statements that re-
fused to enforce all or parts of a law.57 Additionally, Bush’s alleged 
abuse led to the proposal of the Presidential Signing Statements Act 
of 2006.58 Introduced by Senator Arlen Specter, this bill sought to 
prohibit judges from relying on presidential signing statements when 
interpreting federal statutes.59 However, this bill has not been 
enacted, and because of a desire to protect executive power, it is un-
likely any President would sign such legislation into law. Lastly, 
President Bush’s use of signing statements was considered so egre-
gious the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary held a 
hearing on the matter.60 The hearing involved testimony from several 
scholars on a variety of topics. Some offered opinions on the constitu-
tionality of signing statements, while others discussed their role in 
statutory interpretation.61
 Aware of the heavy criticism against his predecessor, President 
Barack Obama vowed to take a more modest approach.62 However, 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 54. Id.; see also Statement Accompanying Signing of Pub. L. No. 107-296, 38 WEEKLY 
COMP. PRES. DOCS. 2092-93 (Nov. 25, 2002).  
 55. ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 24, at 3. 
 56. Id. at 5. 
 57. Id.
 58. See S. 3731, 109th Cong. (2006). 
 59. Id. § 4. A year later, Representative Carol Shea-Porter presented an almost 
identical bill to the House of Representatives called the Presidential Signing Statements 
Act of 2007. H.R. 3045, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 60. See The Use of Presidential Signing Statements: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy, Ranking Member, S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary), available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=1969&wit_id=2629.  
 61. See generally The Use of Presidential Signing Statements: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006), available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/hearing.cfm?id=1969.  
 62. Savage, supra note 51. President Obama even issued a memorandum on 
presidential signing statements discussing the criticism the statements previously 
received. Obama noted that the statements represent “the President’s constitutional 
obligation to take care that the laws be faithfully executed” and promised to take careful 
steps when issuing the statements. Memorandum on Presidential Signing Statements: 
Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 10669 
(Mar. 9, 2009), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2009-03-11/pdf/E9-5442.pdf.  
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because Obama has already challenged “dozens of provisions of bills” 
through the use of signing statements,63 some critics have expressed 
fear that he is following in Bush’s steps. President Obama has re-
ceived several letters from State Representatives expressing their 
disappointment with his “willingness” to issue the statements as 
many “hoped he would roll back the practice, not entrench it.”64 At 
this time, it is difficult to determine the ultimate path President Ob-
ama will take. But, as seen with past Presidents, even minimal use of 
the statements is likely to prompt maximum criticism. 
 Despite the plethora of signing statements issued by past Presi-
dents, few actually contained interpretive declarations.65 Further, 
federal courts have rarely turned to the statements for interpretive 
guidance. In 2007, a search conducted by the United States Govern-
ment Accountability Office discovered that less than 140 federal cas-
es since 1945 cited to presidential signing statements.66 Moreover, 
when courts do cite to signing statements it is normally to decide is-
sues like the date the President signed the legislation or to explain 
the statute’s purpose.67 Although the Reagan Administration tried to 
legitimize signing statements, courts have been reluctant to use the 
statements as interpretive aides. But courts do not always need to be 
apprehensive. Instead, judges should heed President Reagan’s efforts 
because, as explored in the next part of this Note, signing statements 
can provide helpful insight to statutory interpretation. 
III.   A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING 
STATEMENTS AND TRADITIONAL LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
 The increasing prevalence of presidential signing statements re-
quires courts to determine their appropriate place in statutory inter-
pretation. First, courts must decide whether or not signing state-
ments should be classified as a new form of legislative history. To an-
swer this question, Part III compares traditional legislative history to 
presidential signing statements. Second, if signing statements pos-
sess qualities similar to legislative materials, how much deference 
should courts apply to the statements in matters of statutory con-
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 63. Savage, supra note 51. 
 64. Id.
 65. Curtis Bradley and Eric Posner compiled a chart of the signing statements issued 
by President Carter through President George W. Bush. Curtis A. Bradley & Eric A. 
Posner, Presidential Signing Statements and Executive Power, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 307 
(2006). In this chart, they divide the amount of signing statements issued into rhetorical, 
constitutional, and legislative history. Id. at 323. According to their research, the average 
amount of legislative history signing statements issued per year is generally five or fewer. 
See id.
 66. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS 
ACCOMPANYING THE FISCAL YEAR 2006 APPROPRIATIONS ACT 11 (2007),
http://www.gao.gov/decisions/appro/308603.pdf. 
 67. See id.
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struction? Once more, by turning to the traditional sources of legisla-
tive history that courts have relied on for years, this Note attempts to 
establish a unified standard of judicial deference. 
A.   Traditional Legislative History 
 1.   The Courts’ Original Interpretive Toolbox 
 A longstanding witticism states that “examination of statutory 
text is permissible only when legislative history is ambiguous.”68 Al-
though intended as a joke, this saying alludes to the realities of judi-
cial practice as courts frequently use legislative history to clarify am-
biguous statutes. Regarded as the “record of deliberations” pertaining 
to a law’s enactment,69 legislative history represents the compromise 
reached between the House and the Senate when considering pro-
posed legislation. These sources typically include committee reports, 
committee hearings, sponsor statements, floor debates, and confe-
rence reports.70
 During the latter half of the twentieth century, judicial reliance on 
legislative history increased substantially. One scholar observed that 
“[t]he increased availability and accessibility of congressional docu-
ments . . . contributed to growth in citations to legislative history.”71
Yet, an ongoing debate over the proper interpretive function the 
sources serve has persisted within court opinions and law review ar-
ticles for years.72 Those in favor of using legislative history claim that 
it allows the judiciary to discern legislative intent.73 Justice Breyer 
believes legislative materials are particularly useful for many  
functions like: 
(1) avoiding an absurd result; (2) preventing the law from turning 
on a drafting error; (3) understanding the meaning of specialized 
terms; (4) understanding the “reasonable purpose” a provision 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 68. George A. Costello, Average Voting Members and Other “Benign Fictions”: The 
Relative Reliability of Committee Reports, Floor Debates, and Other Sources of Legislative 
History, 1990 DUKE L.J. 39, 39 (1990). 
 69. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., supra note 4. 
 70. Id.
 71. Michael H. Koby, The Supreme Court’s Declining Reliance on Legislative History: 
The Impact of Justice Scalia’s Critique, 36 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 369, 372 (1999). 
 72. The debate concerning the legitimacy of legislative history is quite extensive. 
While this Note offers a glimpse into some common arguments, the full debate is beyond 
the scope of this Note. 
 73. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as 
Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 327 (1900) (“Statements made in committee 
reports and floor statements by sponsors or floor managers of legislation presumably 
represent the legislature’s views on specific issues.”). 
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might serve; and (5) choosing among several possible “reasonable 
purposes” for language in a politically controversial law.74
 Conversely, those against granting legislative history authorita-
tive weight rely on three core arguments. The first rests on the no-
tion that no single unified intent can be attributed to the large, mul-
timember Congress.75 Thus, legislative history is not indicative of 
what Congress, as a whole, intended. The second critique argues that 
judicial reliance on legislative history violates the Constitution, spe-
cifically the Bicameralism and Presentment Clause.76 Opponents con-
tend that giving interpretive weight to legislative history treats it as 
law and therefore violates the Constitution because it has been nei-
ther passed through both houses of Congress nor presented for presi-
dential approval.77 Lastly, some argue these sources allow legislators 
to exert manipulation over the courts. Particularly, “once legislators 
learn that the Court will use legislative history in interpretation, 
they have a great incentive to introduce comments into the record to 
produce desired interpretive outcomes.”78
 Opposition to legislative history has not been solely limited to the 
scholarly realm. In fact, many judges have actively voiced their feel-
ings against the practice. Distinctively, Justice Scalia is known as an 
adamant opponent to judicial reliance on legislative history. An advo-
cate of what is commonly referred to as new textualism, Scalia de-
fends the traditional practice of staying within the confines of the 
statutory text when discerning its meaning.79 Scalia has openly 
shared his views with fellow members of the Court in countless opi-
nions,80 but his criticism of the practice has had only minor implica-
tions on the judicial use of legislative history. Federal courts, includ-
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 74. Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S.
CAL. L. REV. 845, 861 (1992). 
 75. Muriel Morisey Spence, The Sleeping Giant: Textualism as Power Struggle, 67 S.
CAL. L. REV. 585, 592 (1994); see also Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 73, at 327 
(“Committee members and bill sponsors are not necessarily representative of the entire 
Congress, and so it is not necessarily accurate to attribute their statements to the whole 
body.”). 
 76. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 73, at 327. The Bicameralism and Presentment 
Clause is located in article 1, section 7, clause 2 of the United States Constitution. It states 
that “[e]very Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, 
shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United States.” U.S.
CONST. art. 1, § 7, cl. 2. 
 77. Koby, supra note 71, at 377. 
 78. John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673, 
732 (1997). 
 79. See Spence, supra note 75, at 586, 587. 
 80. See e.g., Bank One Chi., N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 280 
(1996) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that “[l]egislative history that does not represent the 
intent of the whole Congress is nonprobative; and legislative history that does represent 
the intent of the whole Congress is fanciful”); Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (“The greatest defect of legislative history is its illegitimacy. We are 
governed by laws, not by the intentions of legislators.”).  
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ing the United States Supreme Court, continue to rely on these in-
terpretive sources as some judges are “too committed to reconstruct-
ing legislative intent . . . to abandon examining legislative history.”81
 2.   The Hierarchy of Legislative History 
 Putting the validity of legislative history aside, selecting which 
type of legislative document to rely on adds another level to the de-
bate. Within the traditional forms of legislative history, courts have 
developed an implicit hierarchy, assigning differing degrees of signi-
ficance to the various sources.82 Consistently favoring some forms of 
legislative history over others, courts typically turn to “such mate-
rials for ‘decisive’ or ‘authoritative’ evidence of congressional in-
tent.”83 Thus, the amount of deference assigned generally depends on 
the speaker’s involvement in drafting legislation and how available 
the speaker’s views are to the congressional membership.84
 Committee reports and sponsor statements claim the top position 
in the hierarchy.85 They are regarded as the most reliable forms of 
legislative history because they embody “the considered and collec-
tive understanding of those Congressmen involved in drafting and 
studying proposed legislation.”86 Additionally, other members of Con-
gress are likely to acquiesce to a sponsor’s understanding of a bill be-
cause the sponsor is presumed to possess considerable knowledge re-
garding the legislation.87 The remaining legislative sources encom-
passed in the hierarchy are regarded as substantially less reliable.88
These materials distort the legislative record because they fail to suf-
ficiently reflect the views of the enacting Congress.89 For example, 
courts seldom rely on statements issued by opponents of legislation 
because the opponents have “every incentive to misstate the  
bill’s effect.”90
 At the bottom of the hierarchy sit nonlegislator statements fol-
lowed by subsequent legislative history, or post-enactment state-
ments.91 It may seem unusual that people outside of Congress pro-
duce documents that comprise legislative history, but the realities of 
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 81. Popkin, supra note 33, at 699. 
 82. Costello, supra note 68, at 41; see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New 
Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 626 (1990) (discussing how courts may “consider certain 
evidence to be more significant than other evidence”).  
 83. Manning, supra note 78, at 680. 
 84. Cross, supra note 26, at 222. 
 85. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., supra note 4, at 302-03. 
 86. Eskridge, supra note 82, at 637 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Zuber 
v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 186 (1969)). 
 87. Id. at 638. 
 88. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., supra note 4, at 304. 
 89. Id.
 90. Id.
 91. See id. at 307. 
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today’s law-making process sometimes require nonlegislators to draft 
statutes. Typical nonlegislators include lobbyists, private interest 
groups, other private organizations, and legislative study commis-
sions.92 However, courts will only defer to nonlegislator statements if 
they offer further support to a decision reached through alternative, 
more reliable materials.93 Arguably, these statements lack sufficient 
reliability because they fail to reflect the views of the enacting legis-
lature.94 Furthermore, there is an incentive for misrepresentation. 
Some claim that nonlegislator statements try to “smuggle private 
deals into public law through the back door.”95 Despite these prob-
lems, courts consider them to possess some interpretive significance, 
though they rely on them with caution.96 Acknowledging that sta-
tutes frequently “reflect carefully crafted compromises among the 
various groups,”97 such statements and commentaries may provide 
interpreting courts with a meaningful source of explanation.98
 Subsequent legislative history, on the other hand, consists of 
statements made after the statute has been enacted. Courts often 
avoid reliance on post-enactment materials for several reasons. Not-
ably, they are usually too vague to clarify an ambiguous statute.99
Some scholars also argue that they do not represent the intent of the 
enacting legislators, making them unreliable.100 Additionally, the fact 
that such statements are offered into the legislative record after the 
bill is enacted deprives the Legislative and Executive Branch of the 
opportunity to comment on or amend the record. This procedural 
lapse invites “insincerity”101 and often leads to comments in the 
record that are only indicative of a single legislator’s opinion.  
 Nevertheless, courts have not completely abandoned subsequent 
legislative history.102 The general standard of judicial deference is to 
invoke the statements when the exact congressional intent is incom-
prehensible;103 however, courts have relied on them in other limited 
situations. For example, in Montana Wilderness Association v. United 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 92. See id. at 305; Eskridge, supra note 82, at 633. 
 93. Eskridge, supra note 82, at 640. 
 94. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., supra note 4, at 305. 
 95. Id.
 96. See id. (discussing the case of Kosak v. United States, 465 U.S. 848 (1984), when 
the Court relied on nonlegislator statements for interpretive guidance). 
 97. Eskridge, supra note 82, at 633-34. 
 98. See id. at 634. 
 99. Id. at 640. 
 100. Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 
Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 205 (1983). 
 101. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., supra note 4, at 306. 
 102. See id. (discussing the case of Montana Wilderness Ass’n v. United States Forest 
Serv., 655 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1981) as an example of judicial reliance on post-enactment 
sources). 
 103. Eskridge, supra note 82, at 640 (citing Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp. v. Shell Oil 
Co., 444 U.S. 572, 596 (1980)). 
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States Forest Service, the court assigned a subsequently issued confe-
rence report “significant weight . . . where it [was] clear that the confe-
rees had carefully considered the issue.”104 Subsequent legislative his-
tory can provide context by shedding light on current societal norms 
and is capable of imparting understanding of congressional intent.105
 This Note barely skims the surface of the ongoing debate over the 
proper application of legislative history. However, the argument 
made in subsequent parts of this Note depends on the assumption 
that legislative history is a helpful source of statutory interpretation. 
Following that assumption, traditional forms of legislative history 
can serve as a guide in answering the question of whether presiden-
tial signing statements could be defined as a new form of legislative 
history with interpretive worth.  
B.   Introduction to the Modern Presidential Signing Statement 
Debate 
 While opinions differ as to the interpretive value of presidential 
signing statements, scholarship tends to favor rejecting this execu-
tive tool as an authoritative guide in statutory construction.106 Some 
of the critiques are similar to those employed by opponents of legisla-
tive history. For example, critics suggest judicial reliance on signing 
statements violates the Bicameralism and Presentment Clause.107
Assigning them interpretive weight arguably treats them as law. 
This offends the constitutionally mandated requirements of enacting 
legislation because the statements have not been reviewed by both 
houses of Congress.108 However, courts acknowledge that signing 
statements are not equivalent to binding law. They recognize the 
statements only serve an assistive role in the overall interpretive 
process, much like other extrinsic sources used to interpret statutes. 
Presidential statements of interpretation are no more law than are 
dictionaries or treatises, and courts are not bound to accept them as 
authoritative. Signing statements are commonly used to “provid[e] 
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 104. 655 F.2d 951, 957 (9th Cir. 1981). 
 105. See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 
VA. L. REV. 423, 467-68 (1988). 
 106. See Waites, supra note 46, at 761 (citing arguments for the complete cessation of 
publication of signing statements); see also Garber & Wimmer, supra note 12, at 363 
(arguing that courts should not refer to presidential signing statements). 
 107. Bradley & Posner, supra note 65, at 344 (stating that judicial reliance on 
presidential signing statements will “allow the [P]resident to legislate without following 
the process for legislation set forth in Article I of the Constitution.”). 
 108. Id.; see also Chad Thompson, Presidential Signing Statements: The Big Impact of 
a Little Known Presidential Tool, 39 U. TOL. L. REV. 185, 204 (2007); see also Bradley & 
Posner, supra note 65, at 344 (stating that judicial reliance on presidential signing 
statements will “allow the president to legislate without following the process for 
legislation set forth in Article I of the Constitution”). 
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context and a basis of understanding the duly enacted law in ques-
tion.”109 Contextual considerations do not violate the Constitution.  
 Critics also contend that signing statements intrude on the judi-
ciary’s ultimate responsibility to “say what the law is.”110 The state-
ments may hinder the court’s ability to make impartial decisions or, 
alternatively, direct the court’s decision to an outcome the President 
desires.111 Presidential appointment of judges exacerbates the prob-
lem even further. If the judges were appointed by the President who 
issued the signing statement, they may feel a sense of loyalty and 
obligation to apply the President’s interpretation.112 Submission to 
presidential influence may discredit the judiciary’s role as an inde-
pendent body, making the courts nothing more than “a mouthpiece of 
presidential policy.”113
 However, this argument places little faith in the judicial system. 
The judiciary is no doubt competent enough to determine if the Pres-
ident is overstepping his authority. Courts can sensibly determine 
how much deference the signing statement should receive.114 Moreo-
ver, from the perspective of the courts, employing signing statements 
in this circumstance is no different than using other legislative 
statements of intent which do not considerably infringe on the judi-
ciary’s role to interpret the law.115 The President’s statements do not 
encroach on judicial power so long as courts have the final say in 
matters of interpretation.116
C.   Signing Statements as a New Form of Legislative History 
 Apart from the aforementioned debate, two additional critiques 
provide a basis for classifying signing statements as a new form of 
legislative history. Many caution against the statements because (1) 
the President is not a legislator and (2) the statements are issued af-
ter the bill is enacted.117 Yet, these characteristics resemble qualities 
found in other legislative materials to which courts give minimal de-
ference—specifically, subsequent legislative history and nonlegislator 
statements. Thus, presidential statements of interpretation should be 
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 109. Thompson, supra note 108, at 205. 
 110. See Cross, supra note 26, at 228 & n.113 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 
177 (1803)). 
 111. Id. at 228. 
 112. See Waites, supra note 46, at 775 (noting President Reagan’s “potential influence 
on the judiciary” as he “appointed over 300 of the 761-member judiciary” within his  
first term). 
 113. Id. at 777. 
 114. See Cross, supra note 26, at 220. 
 115. Id. at 213 n.27. 
 116. Id.
 117. See, e.g. Popkin, supra note 33, at 709; Note, Context-Sensitive Deference, supra
note 10, at 607; ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., supra note 4, at 306. 
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placed alongside those sources in the legislative history hierarchy, 
receiving interpretive credence equivalent to their legislative history 
counterparts. Ultimately, courts should look to signing statements if 
they further support a decision reached with the assistance of other 
interpretive tools or if the intent of the enacting coalition is over-
whelmingly unclear. However, signing statements must meet some 
contingencies before judges can place appropriate reliance on them 
when interpreting statutes. 
 1.   The President as a Nonlegislator 
 The notion that the President is not a member of Congress is, of 
course, a truism. Indeed, the President may be characterized as the 
quintessential nonlegislator.118 Accordingly, many are hesitant to ex-
tend the definition of legislative history because the President’s non-
legislator status forbids him from producing legislative materials.119
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals adhered to this justification in 
Estate of Reynolds v. Martin when it wholly ignored a presidential 
signing statement.120 The court explained that “[i]t is not the Presi-
dent’s place to write federal statutes.”121 Instead, the Constitution 
clearly vests the power to make law in the Legislative Branch and 
bestows limited legislative responsibilities to the President. Accord-
ing to Professor William Popkin, the Constitution restricts the Presi-
dent’s legislative actions to approving or vetoing bills, executing laws 
under Article II, and proposing statutes.122 Professor Popkin argues 
that utilizing signing statements for statutory interpretation exceeds 
these constitutionally proscribed roles.123 Others argue that signing 
statements fail as effective forms of legislative history because 
statements from nonlegislators, such as the President, are “unrelia-
ble indicators of Congress’[s] will.”124
 Nonetheless, these arguments do not justify excluding signing 
statements as a new breed of legislative history. The President is not 
a legislator, but as previously discussed, interpreting courts have 
looked to other nonlegislator statements for context in statutory con-
struction cases.125 Still, in order to receive judicial deference, courts 
require that nonlegislators be closely involved in the law-making 
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 118. See ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., supra note 4, at 306. 
 119. See Popkin, supra note 33, at 709; see also Neil Kinkopf, Signing Statements and 
Statutory Interpretation in the Bush Administration, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 307, 309 
(2007) (noting that “the President is not part of the legislature”). 
 120. 985 F.2d 470, 477 n.8 (1993). 
 121. Id.
 122. Popkin, supra note 33, at 709-13.  
 123. See id. at 709-10. 
 124. See Garber & Wimmer, supra note 12, at 381. 
 125. Eskridge, supra note 82, at 633-34; see also supra notes 91-98 and accompanying 
text. 
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process.126 Thus, the President’s understanding of a statute should be 
given some interpretive weight if he proposed or initiated legislation, 
or was involved in other steps during the course of the enactment.  
 Courts should not ignore the practicalities of today’s political 
process. Judges need to recognize the President is often a pervasive 
force in enacting legislation. Presidents have been involved with 
creating bills since George Washington.127 President Jefferson was 
also known to occasionally “draft[] bills and control[] their progress 
through Congress.”128 Additionally, an early Supreme Court decision 
accepted the President’s ability to influence legislation. In an 1899 
case, the Court observed that “the approval by the President of a bill 
passed by Congress is not strictly an executive function, but is legis-
lative in nature.”129 Currently, it is exceedingly common for Presi-
dents to “work[] closely with Congress to craft a bill and orchestrate 
its passage.”130 To offer a practical example, President Obama recent-
ly proposed the hotly debated health care reform bill. In March of 
2010, the bill was passed and signed into law.131 If President Obama 
had concurrently issued a statement with the legislation, courts 
should have acknowledged the statement’s interpretive value because 
of Obama’s intimate involvement and special knowledge of the bill.  
 The President is able to influence legislation through his veto 
power.132 Once a bill is presented to the President, if he declines to 
sign it into law, he may send the bill back to Congress with his objec-
tions.133 In order to obtain presidential approval, Congress would 
need to reform the bill to meet presidential desires.134 Moreover, the 
mere threat of a presidential veto significantly affects the way Con-
gress shapes legislation.135 For example, during the Nixon Adminis-
tration, Congress “cleaned up” approximately thirty bills because of 
the looming threat of a potential veto.136 The law-making process is 
time-consuming and expensive. In most instances, members of Con-
gress, particularly those within the enacting coalition, have spent 
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 126. See Eskridge, supra note 82, at 633 (stating that “[o]ccasionally, law professors’ 
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 127. Kinkopf, supra note 119, at 309; see also Cross, supra note 26, at 214-15. 
 128. Cross, supra note 26, at 215. 
 129. La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 423, 453 (1899).  
 130. Note, Context-Sensitive Deference, supra note 10, at 605. 
 131. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, H.R. 3590, 111th Cong. (2010). 
 132. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 119, 121 (1975) (“The President is a participant in 
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 133. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. 
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The President’s Place in “Legislative History”, 89 MICH. L. REV. 399, 411 (1990) (“The 
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 136. Cross, supra note 26, at 216 (quoting STEPHEN J. WAYNE, THE LEGISLATIVE 
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extensive hours initiating a bill, drafting the statutory language, de-
bating its merits, and carrying it to the point of presentment to the 
President. While Congress has the power to override a presidential 
veto, it would prefer to avoid a veto completely.137 Thus, the proposed 
bill will normally “reflect the [P]resident’s preference.”138
 The Constitution embraces the President’s significant presence in 
the law-making process. The same constitutional provisions that Pro-
fessor Popkin argues constrain the President in fact support the con-
cept that the President plays a pivotal part in creating the law.139
Under the scope of the Bicameralism and Presentment Clause, Con-
gress cannot successfully enact legislation without presidential ap-
proval.140 This constitutional requirement makes the President and 
Congress partners in the legislative process.141 Thus, the President’s 
understanding of a statute should be given weight in a similar man-
ner as Congress’s.142 The President also obtains legislative influence 
from his Article II powers to recommend to Congress “such 
[m]easures as he shall judge necessary and expedient” and to “take 
[c]are that the [l]aws be faithfully executed.”143 Proposing legislation 
places the President within the enacting coalition.144 If the President 
proposes a bill, he presumably has special understanding of the legis-
lation that should be acknowledged by an interpreting court.145 Addi-
tionally, faithful execution of the law requires some interpretive pow-
er. After all, the President must ascertain the meaning of the law to 
know how to properly execute that law.146
 Given that signing statements encompass the President’s under-
standing of legislation, some opponents claim the statements lack the 
congressional intent that courts generally seek when interpreting 
statutes.147 Likewise, others also claim that the President’s views are 
irrelevant since he only possesses the ability to accept or reject the 
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 137. See Dessayer, supra note 135, at 410-11. 
 138. Bradley & Posner, supra note 65, at 350. 
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statute.148 But, as previously discussed, it is not uncommon for a 
President to propose or draft his own legislation. Nevertheless, to 
successfully effectuate legislative intent, courts should be wary in 
giving deference to presidential signing statements unless the state-
ments themselves “give effect to congressional intent.”149 Ideally, 
courts should apply a method similar to the one employed by Justice 
Stevens in his dissent in Kosak v. United States.150 When questioning 
the function of traditional nonlegislator statements, Justice Stevens 
suggested that nonlegislator intent should not be ascribed to Con-
gress unless there is “positive evidence that elected legislators were 
aware of and shared the [nonlegislator’s] intent.”151 Such reciprocal 
understanding makes signing statements more reliable.152 If a sign-
ing statement includes “congressional testimony . . . before Con-
gress,” or if the interpretation was presented during congressional 
debates, the President’s interpretation of the statute will contain 
some “indicia of reliability.”153 However, this can only be achieved if 
the Executive and Legislative Branches truly act as partners in the 
law-making process.  
 When discerning legislative intent, it is also important to consider 
the President’s ability to control the information on which legislators 
rely to form their decisions.154 Specifically, Presidents help “set the 
agenda for congressional debate, . . . develop[] proposals from inside 
and outside the [E]xecutive [B]ranch, . . . [and] monitor[] congres-
sional deliberations and influence[] congressional judgments.”155
Presidential influence over legislative procedure establishes the pos-
sibility that signing statements may reflect legislative intent.156
 Recognizing the practicalities of the President’s legislative in-
volvement often invokes claims concerning the separation of powers 
doctrine. Allowing the head of the Executive Branch to cross over 
constitutionally established lines of separation not only encroaches 
on the “duty of the [l]egislature to make law,” but also leads to the 
aggrandizement of the President’s power.157 According to those who 
believe one branch of government should not exercise the powers of 
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another, judicial reliance on signing statements is an “unconstitu-
tional exercise of authority” that violates the separation of powers.158
 Courts traditionally viewed the government branches as strictly 
separated from one another, hindering the President’s ability to tra-
verse into the legislative realm.159 Presently, courts are using a “func-
tionalist model” whereby the lines previously drawn between the 
branches are now somewhat blurred.160 The Supreme Court has come 
to embrace this approach. In a 1976 case, the Court condemned strict 
separation because the “hermetic sealing off of the three branches of 
Government from one another would preclude the establishment of a 
Nation capable of governing itself effectively.”161 The separation of 
powers doctrine no longer requires the complete seclusion of the indi-
vidual branches,162 laying to rest what was formerly viewed as consti-
tutional restraints on the President’s ability to create legislation.  
 Based on the President’s vast role in the legislative process, courts 
should not be dissuaded from characterizing signing statements as a 
new form of legislative history. The President’s status as a nonlegis-
lator is an insufficient basis to ignore the interpretive worth these 
statements possess. However, this does not mean every statement 
the President signs upon enacting a bill should be deemed legislative 
history. Courts must be circumspect in extending the definition and 
should only consider signing statements that are accompanied by 
considerable evidence that the President was a “critical partner”163 in 
enacting the law. Moreover, the legislation proposed or modified by 
the President must not have been extensively altered by Congress.164
 Admittedly, requiring judges to determine presidential participa-
tion with a particular piece of legislation would be an extremely diffi-
cult task. The courts will not always know whether the statute they 
seek to interpret is a result of the President’s volition. A President’s 
role may not be as publicized as President Obama’s was with the re-
cent heath-care-reform bill.165 However, to avoid abuse of this execu-
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tive tool, it is important that courts require a showing of presidential 
involvement before deferring to signing statements. Thus, courts 
should not presume legislative involvement. Instead, courts should 
institute a sort of evidentiary standard: if information about the 
President’s role in drafting legislation is not easily ascertainable by 
the judges, the proponent who wishes the court to rely on the signing 
statement should bear the responsibility of showing that the Presi-
dent was involved in the law-making process. The proponent can 
meet this burden by offering evidence that the President drafted the 
legislation, personally proposed the legislation, or worked closely 
with members of Congress throughout the course of enactment.  
 2.   Presidential Signing Statements as Subsequent Legislative 
History 
 The interpretive worth of signing statements can also be eva-
luated by comparing them to subsequent legislative history. Signing 
statements are similar to these traditional legislative sources be-
cause the President issues his interpretations after the bill is passed 
by Congress.166 This characteristic, many argue, makes the state-
ments unreliable because they deprive Congress of the opportunity to 
comment on the President’s remarks.167 In contrast, legislative histo-
ry regarded as especially authoritative, such as committee reports or 
sponsor statements, reflects a compromise resulting from congres-
sional process that allows “each chamber to ratify or respond to . . . 
legislative history.”168 Signing statements are considered problematic 
because they lack indications of congressional deliberations and of 
dialogue between the President and Congress.169
 Some argue that signing statements, like their legislative history 
counterparts, create an opportunity for manipulation.170 The temporal 
characteristic of signing statements precludes Congress from respond-
ing to the President’s statement.171 This may incentivize the President 
to issue interpretations that would oppose congressional intent and 
alter the meaning of the bill into something that Congress would have 
rejected.172 Assumedly, the President may try to shape legislative his-
tory in hopes of achieving a “desired interpretive outcome[].”173
 This theory, however, reaches beyond assumptions and extends to 
reality. Some of President Reagan’s signing statements took con-
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tested political positions in controversial debates.174 President George 
H.W. Bush was also accused of exercising manipulative behavior 
through signing statements.175 In 1992, a case was brought before the 
United States District Court in Massachusetts to determine whether 
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 applied retroactively.176 The legislative 
history surrounding the Act was deemed ambiguous.177 However, 
President Bush’s signing statement declared his understanding that 
the Act did not expressly apply retroactively but provided some ex-
emptions, a stance that contradicted other forms of legislative histo-
ry.178 Acknowledging the potential for manipulation, the court re-
jected the President’s understanding by noting that there was “no 
reason to treat this judgment as anything other than a similar 
statement of intent that was unable to be stated explicitly in the leg-
islation.”179
 Yet, problems of presidential “post-enactment opportunism” can 
be easily “constrained by [the] courts.”180 Judges can evaluate the 
credibility of the signing statements presented to them and deter-
mine their true interpretive value. Still, reliance on presidential 
statements of interpretation should be predicated on their consisten-
cy with other legislative materials and presidential pronounce-
ments.181 By examining presidential signing statements alongside 
more reliable forms of legislative history, the courts can square the 
President’s understanding with Congress’s, eliminating the ability 
for the President to slip in statements that contradict the outcome of 
congressional deliberations. Additionally, by constraining reliance on 
signing statements, the “incentives to introduce comments in the 
record solely to influence future interpretations”182 decreases signifi-
cantly. Under the proposed rubric, the President’s statements should 
be discredited if they do not support an interpretation reached by 
other sources considered to be indicative of congressional intent. This 
eliminates the President’s ability to influence the judiciary’s deci-
sions regarding statutory construction.  
 Deferring to signing statements for interpretive guidance will not 
deviate from the Supreme Court’s opinion on subsequent legislative 
history. In 1980, the Court declared its aversion for judicial reliance 
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on post-enactment statements, “asserting that ‘even when it would 
otherwise be useful, subsequent legislative history will rarely over-
ride a reasonable interpretation of a statute that can be gleaned from 
its language and legislative history prior to its enactment.’ ”183 Sign-
ing statements should never act to override an interpretation reached 
through more reliable legislative sources. Instead, they should only 
provide context to the overall interpretation.  
 Additionally, ignoring the interpretive value of signing statements 
because of their temporal characteristic is inconsistent with the cur-
rent practices of administrative law. In two significant cases, Che-
vron v. NRDC, Inc. and Skidmore v. Swift & Co., the United States 
Supreme Court recognized the permissible practice of delegating in-
terpretive authority to agency opinions.184 Under this doctrine, courts 
frequently rely on the interpretations of Executive Branch agencies 
even though they were issued after the statute’s enactment.185 Courts 
are comfortable providing deference to post-enactment agency inter-
pretations because of the control the Executive Branch has over the 
individual agencies. As Chevron notes, “agencies are not directly ac-
countable to the people,” but the President is.186 For those who ad-
here to this model of presidential control, it may serve as an analogue 
of judicial deference to post-enactment presidential statements. Ar-
guably, it should not make a difference whether post-enactment in-
terpretations of a statute come from an agency or from presidential 
signing statements.187 Deferring directly to the President eliminates 
the middle step and provides some transparency in the political 
process.188 Essentially, as those that follow this theory argue, “ban-
ning reliance on signing statements . . . would only redirect the in-
terpretive process toward the agency without significantly reducing 
the President’s ability to influence the ways statutes are inter-
preted.”189 Thus, the post-enactment characteristic of signing state-
ments does not preclude judicial reliance.
 One may argue that the practicalities of our government suggest 
that signing statements are even more reliable and less problematic 
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than post-enactment and nonlegislator statements. The President is 
often more involved in the legislative process than most interest 
groups and private organizations. Additionally, while the role of con-
gressional members ceases once a bill is signed into law, the Presi-
dent’s involvement continues through the subsequent administration 
and enforcement of the bill.190 The incentive to insert opposing views 
is also greater with legislators than with the President. Because the 
President is often a pervasive force in the legislative process, he has an 
incentive to issue statements that truthfully represent the legislative 
compromise.191 Failure to do so could not only lead to cynicism from 
citizens and other political actors, but could also make it difficult to 
work harmoniously with Congress when enacting future legislation.192
The President is a more visible character than the congressional mem-
bership and, therefore, has more cause to protect his credibility.193
 Nevertheless, these practicalities do not justify assigning presi-
dential statements more interpretive weight than their legislative 
history counterparts. It is unlikely that every citizen is able to name 
all the Senators or Representatives in Congress; however, legislators 
are visible characters within the communities they are charged to 
represent. Accordingly, members of Congress may be equally con-
cerned with their credibility and the image they convey to the public, 
especially if running for reelection. Legislators are also concerned 
about the reputation they may develop within the political communi-
ty. If other members of Congress or the President take offense to a 
legislator’s character or actions, it is presumed they would be less 
willing to support legislation proposed by that individual. Therefore, 
the judicial treatment that presidential signing statements should 
receive is minimal deference equivalent to nonlegislator and post-
enactment statements. 
IV.   IMPLICATIONS OF JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO PRESIDENTIAL 
SIGNING STATEMENTS
 Limiting the function of interpretive signing statements to noth-
ing more than contextual aids will eliminate many of the problems 
associated with their use. However, applying this minimal standard 
of deference may impact the realm of statutory interpretation in sev-
eral ways. The proposed standard of deference is likely to not only 
affect political actors in the law-making process but also judges 
themselves. 
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A.   Practical Implications 
 Although the proper application of signing statements has not 
been ultimately decided, several federal courts adhere to the pro-
posed standard of deference, citing to signing statements when they 
support assertions found in more reliable forms of legislative history. 
For example, the court in Burrus v. Vegliante was tasked with inter-
preting the Hatch Act, a statute that prohibits federal workers from 
engaging in on-the-job political activity.194 The court looked to legisla-
tive materials to determine what forms of political activity were pro-
hibited by the Act. The senate report stated a recent amendment to 
the Act expanded the current law to allow voluntary political activity 
by federal civilian and postal workers as long as the employees are 
off the clock.195 While the senate report alone supported the ultimate 
conclusion, the court turned to President Clinton’s signing statement 
for further support. Deferring to the President’s statement was ap-
propriate because it endorsed the views held by the senate report ex-
plaining that employees can “volunteer on their own time for the 
candidate of their choice.”196
 Other courts have relied on signing statements when they provide 
collateral support to additional legislative materials. In Duffield v. 
Robertson Stephens & Co., the Ninth Circuit rationalized its citation 
to a signing statement on the grounds that it “echoed Congress’[s] 
understanding” of the act subject to interpretation.197 Similarly, in a 
more recent Ninth Circuit case, the court cited to both the House Re-
port and President Clinton’s signing statement to determine the pur-
pose and goal of a statute.198 Thus, the proposed standard will not 
significantly alter the current approach courts follow when relying on 
presidential signing statements. 
 An interesting issue arises, however, when traditional forms of 
legislative history are themselves conflicting. What help can presi-
dential signing statements provide in such a situation? One federal 
court addressed this issue. In United States v. Story, the court was to 
decide whether the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 applied to “strad-
dle crimes,” crimes that began before the Act was effective and con-
tinued after the effective date.199 Determining that the statutory lan-
guage was ambiguous, the court turned to sponsor statements from 
both the House and the Senate.200 The House manager of the bill ex- 
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plained in a footnote that the Act “would not apply to an offense be-
gun before” the effective date.201 However, the Senate sponsor’s 
statement directly opposed that interpretation and argued that the 
sentencing guidelines applied to continuing offenses.202 With these 
legislative materials in contention, the court relied on a statement 
issued by President Reagan that agreed with the Senate.203 Although 
the signing statement conflicted with the House’s understanding, the 
court correctly determined the statement possessed interpretive 
weight because the Executive Branch actively participated in the 
enactment of the Sentencing Reform Act.204
 Story illustrates how courts should consider the realities of the 
legislative process. While noting the President’s involvement with 
the Act, the court appropriately relied on the President’s statement. 
Specifically, the court looked at President Reagan’s statement as part 
of the overall context in the interpretive process. Apart from the sign-
ing statement, the court in Story acknowledged that the decision was 
in line with previous cases and the conclusion reached “advance[d 
the] basic congressional purpose underlying the Guidelines system—
to lessen disparity in sentencing.”205 Thus, using the President’s sign-
ing statement to clarify the application of the Act conformed to the 
proposed minimal level of deference. 
B.   Institutional Implications 
 Applying a minimal deferential standard to presidential signing 
statements may have significant institutional implications. Specifi-
cally, it may affect the interpretive methods used by individual 
judges. A textualist judge may be more inclined to rely on presiden-
tial signing statements than on traditional forms of legislative histo-
ry. Textualists frequently dismiss legislative history as an authorita-
tive basis for statutory interpretation.206 They claim legislative histo-
ry does not properly represent the collective intent of Congress be-
cause committee reports and sponsor statements only embody the 
opinions of a small portion of the congressional membership.207 How-
ever, minimal judicial reliance on presidential signing statements 
avoids some of the problems textualists associate with traditional 
legislative history. 
 If the President partners with Congress to draft a bill, and if Con-
gress does not substantially alter the President’s views, it is likely 
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that both Houses of Congress agree or at least acknowledge the Pres-
ident’s opinion on the matter. Further, if the President works with 
the bill from its inception, Congress is likely aware of the President’s 
interpretation. Moreover, Congress has the opportunity to oppose the 
President’s views before the statute is enacted. Signing statements 
also eliminate the problem of collective intent because the President 
is one person, as opposed to the 535 congressional members, so his 
statements fully embody a unitary understanding.  
 The decisions of Justice Scalia, a widely known textualist, shed 
some light on this concept. Scalia is known as the most “acerbic critic 
of legislative history”208 and is a passionate proponent for the textual-
ist ideals.209 However, like most textualists, Scalia has not shied 
away from other extrinsic sources such as treatises and dictiona-
ries.210 It is possible that presidential signing statements may be one 
of those extrinsic sources to which textualists may now turn. Before 
his appointment to the Supreme Court, Scalia relied on an executive 
signing statement in a 1985 case that came before the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit Court of Appeals.211 Scalia acknowledged the interpre-
tive worth of signing statements again in the 2006 case Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld where he criticized the majority opinion for ignoring the 
President’s signing statement when interpreting the Detainee 
Treatment Act.212 Although opposed to the general use of legislative 
history, Scalia seems to recognize the importance of the President in 
the legislative process. His dissent in Hamdan suggested “there is no 
legal difference between the views of Congress and the [P]resident 
about what a law means.”213
 A recent textualist critique against the use of legislative history has 
surfaced in the form of a delegation argument. Professor Manning ar-
gues that courts should not consider committee reports or sponsor 
statements as representative of congressional intent because doing so 
results in legislative self-delegation, which is a constitutionally prohi-
bited practice.214 Legislative self-delegation occurs when a court grants 
interpretive weight to legislative history. This effectively permits 
committee reports or sponsor statements to provide an interpretation 
of the law on behalf of Congress.215 Manning contends that judicial re-
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 208. Koby, supra note 71, at 379. 
 209. See Eskridge, supra note 82, at 650. 
 210. See Manning, supra note 78, at 702-04 & n.135 (discussing instances where 
Justice Scalia relied on Blackstone’s Commentaries to determine the definitions of  
relevant words).
 211. Waites, supra note 46, at 776. 
 212. Hamdan v. Rumseld, 548 U.S. 557, 665-66 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 213. Charlie Savage, Scalia’s Dissent Gives ‘Signing Statements’ More Heft, THE
BOSTON GLOBE, July 15, 2006, at A3. 
 214. Manning, supra note 78, at 675. 
 215. Id. at 706. 
206 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:179 
liance on legislative history delegates the power to determine statutory 
meaning to legislative agents, such as congressional staffers.216
 Presidential signing statements may be seen as a form of delega-
tion because judicial reliance assigns some interpretive power to the 
Executive Branch. However, this differs drastically from the legisla-
tive self-delegation described by Manning. Delegation through sign-
ing statements is not offensive to the textualist ideals because the 
Executive Branch is independent of Congress.217 The Constitution 
imposes certain hurdles to enact a bill that are quite costly and bur-
densome, so it is not surprising that Congress attempts to delegate 
its law-making authority.218 And, while delegating to the Executive 
Branch is more costly than legislative self-delegation,219 it provides a 
basis for textualists to rely on signing statements. As Manning notes, 
“textualists tolerate executory delegation because it is preferable to 
the alternative—unchanneled judicial application of an assertive 
nondelegation doctrine.”220 Furthermore, if the President partnered 
with Congress in creating the law, Congress would feel more com-
fortable relinquishing some of its authority to the Executive Branch. 
 While under the purview of the Constitution the President is dis-
tinct from the Legislative Branch, he is arguably the 536th member 
of Congress because of his extensive involvement in the legislative 
process. Thus, under textualist notions, the argument would follow 
that deference to signing statements may violate the prohibition 
against self-delegation. Specifically, judicial reliance on signing 
statements allows Congress to assign law-making authority to 
another member involved in drafting bills, the President. It is impor-
tant to note the President’s involvement in legislation. However, un-
der constitutional definitions, the President is not a member of Con-
gress, but the leader of the Executive Branch. While the lines that 
established the separation of powers are not as definitive as they 
once were,221 they still maintain sufficient rigidity to avoid delegation 
problems between the Legislative and Executive Branches. Moreover, 
Professor Manning’s article explicitly applies to traditional forms of 
legislation history and may not pertain to the implications of presi-
dential signing statements. Nevertheless, even if the nondelegation 
argument applies in this circumstance, textualists should not be con-
cerned. If courts adhere to minimal deference, judicial decisions will 
not be substantially altered. Ultimately, signing statements are help-
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ful within the overall context of statutory interpretation and should 
not be ignored. 
V.   CONCLUSION
 As one scholar appropriately states, “[w]hatever one’s views of 
presidential power, the [P]resident has the right and perhaps even a 
constitutional obligation to state his opinion about the meaning of a 
statute.”222 It is time, however, for courts to affirmatively decide 
these statements’ proper role in statutory interpretation. A decision 
needs to be made so judges can comfortably apply a unified standard. 
While one may be quick to dismiss these statements’ interpretive 
worth, the contextual value they offer may outweigh their potential 
problems. If courts acknowledge the realities of the political process, 
the President’s interpretation of statutory text can offer guidance in 
clarifying ambiguities. Providing minimal and contingent deference 
will allow judges to confidently place presidential signing statements 
in their interpretive toolbox, making it easier for the courts to fulfill 
their duty to “say what the law is.”223
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 222. Bradley & Posner, supra note 65, at 363. 
 223. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). 
